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Attempting to Run Before Learning to Walk: 
Problems of the EU's Common Foreign 
and Security Policy 
INTRODUCTION 
"This is Europe's hour," boasted Luxembourg's foreign mmister 
Jacques Poos as he boarded a plane headed for the disintegrating 
Yugoslavia in June 1991. 1 The concept of a common foreign and 
security policy (CFSP) for the members of the European Union (EU) 
was looked upon with great expectations in the wake of the Western 
success in the then recently concluded Gulf War.2 Over the course of 
the past five years, however, the weaknesses and inadequacies of the 
CFSP, which was codified in the 1992 Treaty on European Union 
(Maastricht Treaty), have become readily apparent. 3 Frustration and 
inaction have replaced the high hopes that accompanied Mr. Poos on 
his trip to what is now the "former Yugoslavia."4 The EU began the 
Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) on the revision of the Maas-
tricht Treaty in March 1996,5 with the ruins of its Bosnia policy smol-
dering around it. 6 
1 A Long Hour. THE ECONOMIST, July 22,1995, at 48,48. 
2 See id. 
3 See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Feb. 7, 1992, OJ. (C 224) \, (1992) 
1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter EC TREATY]. 
4 See A Long Hour, supra note \, at 48. 
5 See European Council: EU Leaders to Kick-Start the Inter-Governmental Conference, Eur. Info. 
Service Eur. Rep., Oct. 2, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File. The IGC is a 
15-month review of the Maastricht Treaty which will end in June 1997. See id. Not surprisingly, 
the IGC has moved slowly and produced little of substance since a list of issues was prepared. See 
id. A draft of a revised Maastricht Treaty proposed during the Irish Presidency in December 1996 
was criticized by the French Foreign Minister as a "reflection of the uninspired work conducted 
so far." Joint Franco-German Initiative to Get IGC Moving, Eur. Info. Service Eur. Rep., Dec. 11, 
\996, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File [hereinafter Joint Franco-German Initiative]. 
6 See The Search for Peace in the Balkans: A Primer, NY. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1995, at All [hereinafter 
The Search for Peace]. At Germany's urging, the EU recognized the former Yugoslav republics of 
Croatia and Slovenia in January 1992 and Bosnia in April 1992, resulting in a vicious Serb 
offensive. See id. The EU then made numerous unsuccessful diplomatic efforts to bring peace to 
the region, and several Members committed peacekeeping troops, many of which were taken 
hostage by the Bosnian Serbs in April 1994 and May 1995. See id. Beginning in April 1994 with 
353 
354 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REvIEW [Vol. XX, No, 2 
The ED's Bosnia policy, while only one of numerous failures of the 
CFSP, provides the clearest indication of the many fundamental struc-
tural and legal problems that plague the CFSP.7 Instead of taking joint 
actions in foreign policy as outlined in Title V of the Maastricht Treaty, 
the ED has been effectively relegated to issuing toothless statements 
on major foreign policy issues.8 In addition to problems of identifying 
common interests and charting a clear course in a unified foreign 
policy, the ED faces numerous practical problems that have arisen from 
the CFSP provisions of the Maastricht Treaty.9 The ambiguous nature 
of the CFSP provisions of the Treaty has left questions about the tools 
available to implement the policy; particular roles of the European 
Council, Parliament and Commission; powers of the ED itself as op-
posed to powers of Member States; unanimity in policy-making; devel-
opment of a common security policy and neutrality of Member States; 
and funding for joint actions. lO 
Part I of this Note provides a history of the ED's attempts to develop 
a common foreign and security policy dating back to the 1950s. Part 
II discusses the unique structural aspects of the CFSP. Part III analyzes 
how the above-mentioned problems impede the effective development 
of the CFSP. This Note concludes that the ED must first achieve a 
confluence of interests among its members and clarifY ambiguities in 
United States·led NATO air attacks in response to Bosnian Serb aggression, the United States 
assumed a more active and leading role in working for an end to the conflict. See id. The EU has 
continued to participate on two tracks with a special negotiator for Yugoslavia, and through the 
membership of Germany, France and the United Kingdom in the five-nation "Contact Group," 
which also includes Russia and the United States. See id. A United States-brokered peace plan 
resulted in a cease-fire and peace talks in the United States, which led to the "Dayton Accord" in 
November 1995. See Elaine Sciolino, Balkan Accord: The Overview, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1995, 
at AI. 
7 See Geoffrey Edwards, Common Foreign and Security Policy, 1993 Y.B. EUR. L. 497, 501 (1993) 
[hereinafter Edwards, Common Policy). 
8 See EC TREATY art. ].3; A Long Hour, supra note 1, at 48. In a response to one of the rare 
cases in which the EU acted jointly, the European Parliament criticized Member States in Decem-
ber 1996 for failing to support the EU administrator in the Bosnian city of Mostar with the 
necessary financial and enforcement tools. See EU Failed to Support Mostar Administrator, EP Says, 
Reuter Eur. Community Rep., Dec. 13, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File. The 
Parliament said that the Maastricht Treaty was not sufficiently clear in its guidance for joint actions 
by Member States. See id. 
9 See MARTIN HOLLAND, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY INTEGRATION 127-29 (1993); Edwards, Com-
mon Policy, supra note 7, at 499-500. 
10 See EC TREATY arts. J-].II; HOLLAND, supra note 9, 127-29; Edwards, Common Policy, supra 
note 7, at 499-500. 
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the Maastricht Treaty before it can have a truly "common" foreign and 
security policy. 
1. HISTORY OF ATTEMPTS TO DEVELOP A COMMON FOREIGN 
AND SECURITY POLICY 
Early attempts at foreign and security policy integration among 
Western European states began in the early 1950s with efforts by six 
governments to establish a European Defense CommunityY The at-
tempt failed to pass the French National Assembly and was subse-
quently abandoned by the other states. 12 A less ambitious but more 
successful attempt at formal European Community cooperation in the 
area of foreign policy began in 1969 in response to the numerous 
superpower crises of the period.13 
The Hague Heads of State and Government meeting of 1969 inaugu-
rated European Political Cooperation (EPC) , which over the next 
decade was transformed into a somewhat recognizable foreign policy.14 
EPC occurred in an inter-governmental manner dependent on unan-
imous consent and outside the purview of the Treaty of Rome. 15 At the 
outset, EPC was not intended to be a legalistic institution, but rather 
a "pragmatic enterprise" which lacked institutional structure and for-
mal obligations normally associated with Community policies. 16 
EPC finally received a formal treaty-base in the 1986 Single Euro-
pean Act. 17 This new legal base for the EPC, however, did not eliminate 
the legal distinction between the Community and the EPC.IS Retaining 
its status as an "extra-Community" activity, the EPC could only draw on 
the powers provided in the 1986 Single European Act. 19 
11 See Reinhardt Rummel, Western European Cooperation in Foreign and Security Policy, 531 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 112, 114 (1994). 
12 See id. 
13 See HOLLAND, supra note 9, at 118. Tensions between the United States and the U.S.S.R. were 
high because of the Vietnam War, the Arab-Israeli "Six-Day War" of 1967, and the Soviet-led 
crushing of the "Prague Spring" reforms in Czechoslovakia in 1968. 
14 See id. 
15 See id. 
16 See id. 
17 See Douglas Hurd, Developing the Common Foreign and Security Policy, 70 INT'L AFF. 421, 422 
(1994). 
18 See HOLLAND, supra note 9, at 121. 
19 See id. 
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Two decades of EPC had indeed seen a degree of convergence in 
foreign policy, with an increase in both the depth and the breadth of 
coordination.20 By the end of the 1980s the intergovernmental struc-
ture of the EPC had been clearly defined. 21 The EC Presidency repre-
sented the Community in all international relations; in this task the 
Presidency was assisted by the EPC Secretariat.22 The Commission was 
"fully associated" and served as the "thirteenth" party participant (in 
addition to the twelve member states) in EPC decision-making, which 
continued to be governed by consensus.23 Finally, the European Parlia-
ment was kept informed of EPC business but remained peripheral to 
the process of EPC. 24 
Two decades of EPC had also been sufficient time for flaws to 
become visible: the consensus requirement was onerous and the results 
modest.25 Furthermore, the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and 
the reunification of Germany called for a stronger leadership role for 
the EU and the reform of EPC. 26 The foreign policy mechanism of the 
EU was thus refined in the Maastricht Treaty, signed in February 1992, 
to ensure that a European voice would continue to be heard on foreign 
policy in the rapidly changing post-Cold War world.27 
Article ].1 (2) of the Maastricht Treaty outlines foreign policy and 
security goals and includes "safeguard[ing] the common values" of the 
Union, "preserv[ing] peace and strengthen[ing] international secu-
rity" and "develop[ing] and consolidat[ing] democracy and the rule 
of law. "28 The goals are to be realized through enhanced and systematic 
cooperation among the Member States, leading to 'Joint action in 
areas in which the Member States have important interests in com-
mon."29 The CFSP provisions in the Treaty also call for consultations 
within the Council on topics of general interest and require national 
foreign policies to conform to common positions taken by the EU.30 
20 See Hurd, supra note 17, at 422. 
21 See HOLLAND, supra note 9, at 122. 
22 See id. 
23 See id. 
24 See id. at 122-23. 
25 See id. at 123. 
26 See HOLLAND, supra note 9, at 123. 
27 See EC TREATY arts. J-].l1. 
28 [d. art.].l (2). 
29 [d. art.].l (3). 
30 See id. art.].2(l)-(2). 
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The most radical shift in the foreign policy-making apparatus is the 
provision for developing and executing the common foreign policy.31 
The European Council (Council) shall decide which matters should 
be the subject of joint action and, when adopting the joint action, 
define those matters on which decisions are to be taken by qualified 
majority.32 In a concession toward the sovereignty concerns of Member 
States, the Treaty allows for the possibility of states abstaining from 
joint action with Council approval provided that the abstention does 
not impair the overall effectiveness of the action. 33 
Important issues that are conspicuously absent or inadequately ad-
dressed in the Treaty's CFSP provisions include security policy, guide-
lines on foreign policy tools available to implement the CFSP and, 
more importantly, sources and methods for funding this implementa-
tion. 34 The future security policy of the EU is one of the most conten-
tious issues of the CFSP.35 Article ].4 addresses this issue in a vague 
manner with a pledge that it will "respect" the NATO obligations of 
certain Member States and a request that the Western European Union 
(WEU) act as the defense arm of the EU.36 There is no mention in the 
Treaty's security provisions of the role and duties of neutral states such 
as Ireland and new members Austria, Sweden, and Finland, which now 
constitute a substantial bloc of the fifteen Member StatesY 
II. UNIQUE STRUCTURAL FEATURES OF THE CFSP 
Despite the great fanfare surrounding the establishment of the CFSP, 
the policy represents little more than a modest step forward for the 
EU.38 The CFSP remains an intergovernmental process, outside of the 
regular EU system.39 The CFSP is, however, somewhat unique, because 
while it is legally separate from the EU, policy is developed with varying 
31 See id. art. ].3(1)-(2). 
32 See EC TREATY art. ].3(1)-(2). 
33 See id. art. ].3(7). 
34 See id. arts . .J.4,.J.ll (2). 
35 See A Long Hour, supra note 1, at 49. 
36 See EC TREATY art. .J.4(2)-(4). All NATO members of the EU (except Denmark) belong to 
the WEU. See A Long Hour, supra note 1, at 49. Ireland, Austria, Sweden, and Finland claim to 
be "neutral" and are not members of NATO or the WEU. Id. 
37 See EC TREATY art. .J.4(2)-( 4). 
38 See Geoffrey Edwards, European Political Cooperation, 1992 YB. EUR. L. 643, 644 (1992) 
[hereinafter Edwards, Political Cooperation] 
39 See id. 
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degrees of participation by the EU's supranational institutions such as 
the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament.4o 
Noticeably absent from the CFSP process is the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) , which was not granted jurisdiction over any of the issues 
relating to Title V of the Maastricht Treaty.41 Instead, the Member 
States, acting through the Council under Article ].1, are responsible 
for ensuring that each supports the "Union's external and security 
policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual soli-
darity."42 The only way in which the ECJ would be able to decide 
matters with foreign policy implications is when a provision from one 
of the Community treaties is at issue.43 
The jurisdiction of the ECJ is spelled out in Article L of the Maas-
tricht Treaty, which gives it jurisdiction over various provisions of the 
Treaty, but not over the CFSP in Title V. 44 The ECJ does, however, have 
jurisdiction over Article M, which safeguards the EU treaties from 
being affected by provisions of the Maastricht Treaty, including the 
CFSP in Title V.45 Thus, the Court can and must police the borderline 
between the EU and the "extra-Union" CFSP.46 
The absence of the ECJ from the CFSP process reflects the desire of 
Member States that the CFSP remain under political rather than judi-
cial contro1.47 The Council, composed of Heads of States or Govern-
ment, defines the principles of and general guidelines for the CFSP.48 
The Council of Ministers takes decisions for defining and implement-
ing the CFSP on the basis of the guidelines established by the Counci1.49 
The concentration of decision-making power in one single institution 
such as the Council allows for swift action and consistency.5o 
40 See Ricardo Bono, The International Powers of the European Parliament, the Democratic Deficit, 
and the Treaty on European Union, 1992 Y.B. EUR. L. 85, 125 (1992). 
41 See id.; see also EC TREATY arts. J-].I1. 
42 EC TREATY art.].1 (4); see Edwards, Political Cooperation, supra note 38, at 644. 
43 See Nanette Neuwahl, Foreign and Security Policy and the Implementation of the Requirement of 
"Consistency" Under the Treaty on European Union, in LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY 
227,244 (David O'Keefe & Patrick Twomey eds., 1994). 
44 See EC TREATY art. L; M.R. Eaton, Common Foreign and Security Policy, in LEGAL ISSUES OF 
THE MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra note 43, at 215, 221. 
45 See EC TREATY art. M; Eaton, supra note 44, at 221. 
46 See Eaton, supra note 44, at 221. 
47 See Marise Cremona, The CFSP and External Relation Powers of the European Community, in 
LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra note 43, at 247, 256. 
48 See EC TREATY art.].8 (1). 
49 See id. art. ].8(2). 
50 See Neuwahl, supra note 43, at 239. 
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As the Council has been assigned the Commission's usual role of 
initiating and forming policy for the CFSP, the Commission must share 
the right of initiation with Member StatesY The Maastricht Treaty also 
stipulates that the Commission is to be "fully associated with the work 
carried out in the CFSP field. "52 The Commission does have the poten-
tial to play a valuable supporting role in the' CFSP by ensuring a 
consistent approach between external policy within the Union sphere, 
such as foreign aid and trade, and the "extra-Union" CFSP.53 
It is the role of the European Parliament (Parliament) that is most 
limited under the CFSP.54 Parliament had wanted to be the body to 
approve the "important interests in common" that would be defined 
by the Council, define the CFSP, monitor its application, and control 
a right of veto over the use offorce.55 Instead, it was given the right to 
be consulted on the main aspects of the CFSP and the right to be kept 
informed of the development of foreign and security policy.56 Parlia-
ment is therefore not involved in the decision-making process in any 
substantial mannerY Former British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd 
sees this role as quite appropriate, reflecting the inter-governmental 
nature of the CFSP: "[t]he European Parliament should be kept in-
formed about CFSP business, but governments must be answerable first 
and foremost to their national parliaments for the foreign policy deci-
sions they take."58 
The inter-governmental nature of the CFSP alleviates the concerns 
about the "democratic deficit" that currently plagues other EU institu-
tions.59 Member States, however, still desire the option to exercise their 
sovereignty and act on an individual basis when particular national 
interests are at stake that are not shared by other Member States.5O The 
51 See EC TREATY art.].8(3). 
52 [d. art. ].9. 
53 See Hurd, supra note 17, at 424-25. In this capacity, the Commission will be able to prevent 
embarrassing mishaps such the granting of foreign aid to governments sanctioned for human 
rights atrocities under the CFSP. See id. 
54 See Neuwahl, supra note 43, at 242. 
55 [d. 
56EC TREATY art.].7. 
57 See Hurd, supra note 17, at 425. 
58 [d. 
59 "Democratic deficit" refers to the lack of accountability in the political structure of the 
European Union (specifically in the Commission) and the generally weak powers of the demo-
cratically elected European Parliament. Prospects for EMU & Formation of Multi-Tier EU, Econ. 
Intelligence Unit Country Forecasts-W. Eur., Feb. 1, 1995. available in LEXIS, World Library, 
Allwld File. 
60 See Hurd, supra note 17, at 423. 
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Maastricht Treaty's CFSP provisions allow states to pursue national 
action in cases where the Council has chosen not to define a common 
position.61 For example, British negotiations with the Chinese over the 
future of Hong Kong would thus be permitted.62 Member States may 
also, upon Council approval, excuse themselves from joint action pro-
vided that such decisions do "not run counter to the objectives of the 
joint action or impair its effectiveness."63 
Problems with the CFSP are more likely to occur when a state has a 
perceived national interest and prevents the Council from developing 
a common position favored by other Member States.64 As the Council 
must decide and implement all major policy action by unanimity, one 
state may delay the process by casting a veto.65 Greece, for instance, has 
been able to prevent the establishment of closer ties between the EU 
and Macedonia because it claims that the name "Macedonia" implies 
that the former Yugoslav republic has designs on Greek territory.66 It 
is obvious that commitment to a common policy is most difficult where 
Member States are internally divided or politically vulnerable, as has 
often been the case over the former Yugoslavia.67 Unfortunately, these 
difficult issues are the issues that most desperately need direction from 
the EU. 
III. IMPEDIMENTS TO AN EFFECTIVE CFSP 
A. The Unanimity Requirement 
The EU's feeble response to the crisis in the Balkans is a testament 
to the fact that internal squabbling and an insistence on unanimity 
leads to the lowest common denominator or to gridlock.68 The EU 
statement of 29 May 1995, issued in response to the taking of hostages 
61 See EC TREATY art. ].2; Edwards, Political Cooperation, supra note 38, at 645. 
62 See Hurd, supra note 17, at 423. 
63 EC TREATY art. ].3(7); see HOLLAND, supra note 9, at 127. 
64 See A Long Hour, supra note I, at 49. 
65 See EC TREATY art.].8(2). 
66 See A Long Hour, supra note I, at 48. 
67 See Edwards, Political Cooperation, supra note 38, at 645. Other examples include the inability 
of Member States to develop effective common positions on the Middle East peace process, the 
division of Cyprus and disputes between Greece and Turkey in general. See EU: A Look Behind 
the News-A Common EU Foreign Policy Will Not Spring Up Simply, Reuter Textline-Agence Eur., 
July 25, 1996, available in LEXlS, World Library, Allwld File. 
68 See Werner Hoyer, Speech on Germany and IGC (Sept. 14, 1995), in Reuters Eur. Community 
Rep., Sept. 14, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File [hereinafter Speech by Hoyer J. 
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by Bosnian Serb forces, is characteristically weak.69 It states, in relevant 
part: 
The European Union expresses its very grave concern at 
the worsening of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
profoundly regrets its victims. 
It voices its indignation at the deliberate shelling of the ci-
vilian population and at the odious hostage taking of United 
Nations soldiers and observers. The European Union firmly 
condemns the attitude of the Bosnian Serbs and warns them 
of the consequences they might face .... 
It calls for the Bosnian Serbs to cease the shelling and for 
the immediate and unconditional release of the United Na-
tions soldiers detained and threatened by them. 70 
It is pure folly on the part of the EU to release an innocuous 
statement such as this with any expectation that it will compel action. 
The impotency of this message exposes the internal disarray that exists 
among EU Member States with conflicting interests in foreign policy. 
It is these conflicting interests that prevent the EU from issuing 
stronger, more compelling statements and continue to impair the 
effectiveness of the CFSP. 
The problem presented by these conflicts is magnified by the provi-
sion of the CFSP requiring that decisions are made by unanimity, as 
one member's reservations can derail a consensus among the other 
fourteen. 71 Champions of the EU's CFSP may point to "successes" in 
other areas, such as the unlimited extension of the Nuclear Non-Pro-
liferation Treaty (NPT) , as evidence of accomplishment despite the 
unanimity requirement.72 Unanimous agreement on non-contentious 
issues such as the NPT, where the policy path is obvious, however, is a 
remarkably minor achievement. It is possible for decisions on joint 
action to be taken on a qualified majority basis, but only after a unan-
imous decision to do SO.73 In general, joint action on foreign policy will 
require unanimity unless economic measures are envisaged, in which 
"Lowest common denominator" means the strongest policy on which each Member State, all with 
differing interests, is willing to support. See id. 
69 See Role of the Union in the World, BULL. EUR. UNION (Eur. Commission, Brussels), May 1995, 
at 51-52. 
70Id. 
71 See EC TREATY art. ].8(2). 
72 See Speech by Hoyer, supra note 68. 
73 See EC TREATY arts. ].8(2), ].3(2); Cremona, supra note 47, at 256. Issues with defense 
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case the Council will act by qualified majority under the Maastricht 
Treaty.74 
Further enlargement of the ED will exacerbate the problem of 
reaching a consensus as the entrance of applicants from Eastern and 
Central Europe could push membership to eighteen, well beyond the 
twelve members that existed when the Maastricht Treaty was signed in 
1992.75 Advocates of majority voting claim that as the application of 
the majority principle to internal issues was able to overcome the 
"Eurosclerosis" of the early 1980s, the use of qualified majority voting 
in foreign policy would break the gridlock that has characterized the 
CFSP.76 At present, however, Britain, France and Greece are unwilling 
to part with their ability to veto ED action under the current unanimity 
system.77 
B. Lack of Coordination and Clarity 
While hampered by the unanimity requirement, the CFSP is unique 
from its EPC predecessor in the sense that it provides for joint action 
by Member States.78 There are, however, inadequate provisions in the 
Maastricht Treaty addressing the arduous task of coordinating that 
action and the possible forms that it might take. 79 A professional staff 
within the Council would provide the means to analyze, define, pro-
applications are not subject to the qualified majority voting procedure outlined in Article ].3. See 
EC TREATY arts.].3(2),].8(2). 
74 See Cremona, supra note 47, at 256. The power to take economic measures in foreign policy 
was not granted under the CFSP (which is inter-governmental in nature) and thus remains within 
the internal structure of the EU. See id. 
75 European Union membership was expanded to 15 on January 1, 1995, with the admission 
of Austria, Sweden and Finland. The most likely candidates for further expansion are the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia. See Roy Denman, Central and East Eumpean Candidates Will 
Have to Do Better, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 1, 1995, available in LEXlS, World Library, Allwld 
File. 
76 See Speech by Hoyer, supra note 68. The term "Eurosclerosis" was coined in the early 1 980s 
to describe the period of sluggishness in the development of the EU when all issues, however 
minor, languished until all Member States could agree. See The Business of Europe, THE ECONO-
MIST, Dec. 7, 1991, at 63, 63. The 1986 Single European Act introduced qualified majority voting 
and allowed for the passage of measures with less than unanimity, thus accelerating the drive 
toward a single market in Europe. See id. 
77 See A Long Hour, supra note 1, at 49. In late 1996, France showed some flexibility on this 
matter, backing an increased use of qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers "as far 
as possible." Joint Franco-German Initiative, supra note 5. 
78 See EC TREATY art. ].3. 
79 See id. 
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pose and coordinate foreign policy, just as the Commission does for 
internal policies.80 In December 1996, in an effort to give the CFSP an 
external face, French and German leaders proposed the appointment 
of a high-ranking policy figure to represent the EU in foreign affairs.8l 
This individual would be designated by common agreement among 
the Member States and would be responsible to the Counci1.82 A central 
planning body or high-ranking policy figure would improve coordina-
tion among disparate elements and promote much-needed clarity in 
foreign policy.83 
Due in part to the lack of guidance and coordination, the EU's 
floundering common foreign policy has been characterized by weak 
joint statements, rather than by the joint action called for under the 
Maastricht Treaty.84 The form that joint action may take is not specified, 
but the Council is given the necessary decision-making powers "on the 
basis of general guidelines adopted by the European Council" in order 
to ensure "the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the 
Union."85 A wide variety of actions should then be permissible if the 
absence of specific guidelines on the instruments available to carry out 
the common policy is understood to mean that all foreign policy 
instruments normally available to individual sovereign states would also 
be available to the EU as a whole.86 
Financial aid, cooperation agreements, and codes of conduct have 
all been used as non-military foreign policy tools in the past with 
varying degrees of effectiveness, but sanctions have proven to be the 
most effective and most commonly used instrument.87 The legal basis 
for sanctions, however, does not stem from the Maastricht Treaty, but 
rather Articles 113, 223, 224, and 235 of the Treaty of Rome.88 The lack 
80 See Paul Taylor, France to Seek EU Foreign and Defense Instruments, Reuter Eur. Community 
Rep., Nov. 22, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File. 
8! See Joint Franco-German Initiative, supra note 5. 
82 See id. 
83 See id.; Taylor, supra note 80. 
84 See EC TREATY art. ].3.; A Long Hour, supra note 1, at 48. 
85EC TREATY art.].8(2). 
86 See HOLLAND, supra note 9, at 128. 
87 See id. 
88 See id. Article 113, which addresses commercial policy, was utilized to invoke sanctions against 
Iran and the Soviet Union in 1980. See id. Article 223 was employed for the 1980 arms embargo 
against Iran, while Article 224 was invoked under crisis conditions relating to the Falklands War. 
See id. at 128-29. Article 235 is the most flexible, allowing the Council, acting unanimously, to 
take 'appropriate measures' to realize any treaty objective. See HOLLAND, supra note 9, at 129. 
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of provisions in the Maastricht Treaty for this type of action will result 
in conflict between the EU and Member States as CFSP is intergovern-
mental in nature, while sanctions, because of their economic nature, 
fall under the control of the internal EU structure.S9 The legal basis 
under which sanctions are invoked is fundamental to their success and 
credibility as a foreign policy too1.90 Clear provisions for the imposition 
of sanctions would serve to improve both the credibility and effective-
ness of the CFSP. 
C. Undeveloped Security Policy 
The issue that would provide the most benefit and credibility to the 
EU's CFSP is also one of the most contentious: a common security 
policy. The lack of a military capability to support its common policy 
has hobbled the EU in the former Yugoslavia and forced it to rely on 
NATO (and therefore the United States) as an enforcement mecha-
nism.9 ] The CFSP includes provisions for a common security policy that 
are intended to lead to the framing ofa common defense policy, which 
might eventually lead to a common defense.92 
The Maastricht Treaty makes an important distinction between se-
curity and defense issues.93 Defense is considered to be any matter 
relating to the deployment of troops, while other issues such as non-
proliferation fall under the security heading.94 The CFSP acknowledges 
the NATO obligations of its various members and pledges that the 
CFSP will be compatible with the common security and defense policy 
established within that framework. 95 Action in the defense area is to be 
handled by the European pillar of NATO, the Western European 
Union (WEU), rather than through the Council,96 
In the Maastricht Treaty, the EU "requests the WEU, which is an 
integral part of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions 
which have defense implications. "97 It can be understood that if coop-
eration on political and economic aspects of security are not being 
addressed by the WEU, the procedures set forth in article].3 may be 
89 See id. 
90 See id. 
91 See The Search for Peace, supra note 6. 
92 See EC TREATY art.].4 (l) . 
93 See id.; Hurd, supra note 17, at 426. 
94 See Hurd, supra note 17, at 426. 
95 See EC TREATY art. ].4( 4). 
9fi See Cremona, supra note 47, at 252. 
97 EC TREATY art. ].4(2) 
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used.98 While the phrasing of the WEU's role in CFSP is ambiguous, it 
anticipates a larger future role for the WEU.99 In December 1996, 
France and Germany pushed for the inclusion of language in the 
revised Maastricht Treaty arising from the IGC, stating the goal of 
"gradually integrating the WEU into the European Union" on a spe-
cific schedule. lOo 
The merger of the WEU and EU, while providing the EU with a 
means to carry out peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, would 
leave Denmark and neutral Member States in a quandary.IOI Because 
neutrality and WEU membership are incompatible, these states are 
faced with three options: observer status at WEU, the possibility of 
taking on certain WEU humanitarian and rescue peacekeeping and 
crisis management tasks, or full WEU membership. 102 Ireland has stated 
that it will present to its people in a referendum the outcome of any 
negotiations that would involve Ireland's participation in a common 
defense policy, thereby ensuring that its neutral status is unchanged 
unless the Irish people decide otherwise. 103 
D. Budgeting Procedure 
The possibility that the EU would undertake joint action necessarily 
raised the issue of the financial base of the CFSP.I04 The CFSP addresses 
this issue in a cursory manner in the last section of the last article of 
the CFSP, assigning administrative costs to the Community budget 
while leaving the assignment of operating costs unresolved. 105 Not 
surprisingly, an issue that was contentious enough to be included in 
98See id. arts.].3,].4(3). 
99 See id. art. ].4(2). 
100 See Joint Franco-German Initiative, supra note 5; see also Angus MacKinnon, EU Leaders Seek 
to Avert Crisis Over Maastricht II, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Sept. 21, 1995, available in LEXIS, 
World Library, Allwld File. The expiration of the WEU Treaty in 1998 presents an opportunity 
for merging the organization with the EU. See MacKinnon, supra. 
101 See id.; see also supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
102 See Gay Mitchell, Fragility of the Means of Dealing with Major Threats is Challenge for Europe, 
IRISH TiMES, Sept. 23, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File. The German Christian 
Democrats proposed a plan in September 1996 under which almost all of the tasks of the WEU 
would be included in the revised Maastricht Treaty, but the provision for common defense would 
be addressed in a separate protocol which the neutral states would not have to sign. See German 
Plans for Neutrals to Join EU Defense, Reuter Eur. Community Rep., Sept. 16, 1996, available in 
LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File. 
103 See Mitchell, supra note 102. 
104 See Edwards, Common Policy, supra note 7, at 500. 
105 See EC TREATY art.].11 (2). 
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the Treaty without being resolved remains that way five years later. 106 
The Treaty offers two "payment plans" for the Council to choose from, 
either charging operating expenses to the regular Community budget 
or charging expenditures to Member States in accordance with a scale 
to be determined. l07 
The option of charging expenditures to the individual states stems 
from the fact that actions taken under CFSP are actions of the states. lOS 
This plan is supported by the British because of fears that the Euro-
pean Parliament will use its powers under internal EU budgeting rules 
to change decisions made by the Member States under the CFSP.109 
Despite the inter-governmental nature of the CFSP, this issue could 
appear before the ECl because of its effect on EU institutions and the 
budget. 110 
Mindful of this potential clash with Parliament, the vast majority of 
other Member States continue to favor financing CFSP directly from 
the EU budget so as to avoid disagreements over financing for each 
particular joint action and the distribution of the financial burden.11! 
In 1995, CFSP was reincorporated into the EU budget under protest 
from some Member States. ll2 As financing for CFSP remains a con-
tested issue, it will continue to be debated during the current IGC and, 
perhaps, beyond. ll3 
CONCLUSION 
Member states should use the opportunity presented by the Inter-
Governmental Conference to strengthen the obvious weaknesses of the 
106 See Edwards, Common Policy, supra note 7, at 500. 
107 SeeEC TREATY art.J.11(2). 
108 See Edwards, Common Policy, supra note 7, at 500. 
109 See Common Foreign and Security Policy: Community Financingfor External Actions?, Eur. Info. 
Servo Eur. Rep., Feb. 23, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File [hereinafter Com-
munity Financing]. 
110 See Edwards, Common Policy, supra note 7, at 500-01. 
III See Community Financing, supra note 109. The contentious debate arising from the question 
of financing for operations in Bosnia is a prime example. See id. 
112 See Eumpean Parliament Completes First Reading of 1995 Budget, Eur. Info. Servo Eur. Rep., 
Oct. 29, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File. 
113 See Edwards, Common Policy, supra note 7, at 500. Italy presented a proposal at the ICC in 
November 1996 in which operational spending for the CFSP would be drawn from the Commu-
nity budget unless the Council decides by qualified majority in a particular case to shift the burden 
to the Member States. See ICC/Italy-Proposals of Amendments on CFSP, Reuter Textline-Agence 
Eur., Nov. 5,1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File. Presently, unanimity is necessary 
to spend money from the Community budget. See id. 
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CFSP. Agreeing on a single method of financing would be a positive 
step which probably could be accomplished with a simple guarantee 
by the Parliament not to change CFSP budget items agreed upon by 
the Member States. Members should move to appoint a representative 
for foreign affairs and establish a small planning staff under the Coun-
cil to assist in the necessary policy coordination that is currently lack-
ing. Efforts should also be made to more clearly codifY the potential 
forms of joint action and provide the legal framework within the CFSP 
through which they may be implemented. The legal basis for the use 
of valuable tools such as sanctions should therefore exist under the 
CFSP rather than solely under the Treaty of Rome. 
The larger issues of unanimity voting and security policy lack such 
simple solutions and raise doubts about the fundamental viability of 
the CFSP. The struggle over unanimity will continue because of the 
difficult balance between retaining some degree of national sover-
eignty in the foreign policy arena and the desire to obtain a workable 
system for devising and implementing a common foreign policy. Simi-
larly, the debate on security policy and the incompatibility of neutral 
states with NATO and WEU members turns on the degree to which 
states wish to commit themselves to a supranational body and relin-
quish the sovereign right of states to determine their own security 
policy. 
British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind has stated that a common 
policy "implies an identity of interests" and "we have not got it yet, nor 
are we likely to in the foreseeable future. "114 Contrary to Foreign 
Minister Poos' statement, this is not yet "Europe's hour."ll5 The EU 
must continue its efforts to bring national policies on foreign affairs 
closer together, while strengthening institutions and clarifYing ambi-
guities in the CFSP provisions of the Maastricht Treaty. Until the EU 
reaches the point where interests coincide, however, it must proceed 
slowly and gain competence in less contentious areas before attempt-
ing to tackle larger ones such as Bosnia with empty promises. 
John J Kavanagh 
114 Palmerston's Duty, THE TIMES (London), Sept. 22, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, 
Allwld File. 
115 See A Long Hour, supra note 1, at 48. 
